Friday, March 2, 2012

Dream Makers: Occupation of Afghanistan (2012) and Colonization of Hong Kong (1841)

A number of American officers, high and low ranks, advisers and trainers, were killed by Afghans, creating panics. For our fellow Americans, leadership in particular, who still harbor hope of pacifying – democratizing Afghanistan to secure our national interests in the guise of betterment of human kind, they are well advised to spare some time to read my recent work on POLICING IN HONG KONG (Ashgate, 2012) pp. 16 - 18 regarding how the British fared as a colonial master:

To the British colonial officers and resident traders, Hong Kong was an unruly place because the people did not follow expectations61 and were not amenable to control.62 They had few social bonds and were exposed to many corrupting influences and illegitimate opportunities. British officials characterized Chinese migrants as fugitives from the law, gold diggers or drifters:

In a new settlement, wrested from the Chinese by force of arms, although England be at open war the Chinese government and the Chinese population, yet the latter are invited to repair to hold lands, to build houses, and to become denizens; with such an invitation, under the state of war between the two countries, we have long and often said that only the worst spirits of the warn-out time would flock to Hongkong—our prediction has been fulfilled to the very letter; all that there is of bad and worse in China have flocked and are flocking to Hongkong.63

The Hong Kong inhabitants, day laborers (from Kowloon) and transient workers (from China) were also feared as “terrorists” ever ready to destabilize Hong Kong, especially in the early years of the colonization (“seizure”) of Hong Kong, first without a treaty, and finally under the “unequal” Treaty of Nanking. Indeed, the British were seen as aggressive and shameless “foreign devils” who had invaded China on account of opium trade, and who, after all, were unwelcome guests of the magnanimous Emperor. This view stirred up resentful and emotional sentiments of the most powerful kinds: nationalism, regionalism and anti-foreignism. Thus people who worked with/for the British were labeled “han jiang” (traitor), registering the sense of betrayal.

The apprehension of the Chinese was real and palpable to the ruling British. In time chronic fear transformed into paranoia and a state of hysteria. At one point rumors were heard such as: “The Chinese are making preparations to attack Hongkong. The force is variously estimated at ten to fifteen thousand men ….”64

But for the Hong Kong foreign communities, disorderly soldiers and sailors could be just as bad: a letter to the editor published in Friend of China in 1842 read: “Sir, the disgraceful scenes of which our streets are the arena, call loudly for magisterial interferences, each day they become worse and worse. You must be quite sure. I can only allude to the drunken delinquencies of our soldiers and sailors: for the conduct of our native population, by contrast is truly admirable.”65

The moral panic66 generated by hateful and contemptuous (“terrorists”), and otherwise immoral and depraved (“criminals”) Chinese, lurking in every corner waiting to strike at every expat, was both real and unnerving. No one was spared, not even well-guarded governors. It was reported in the news:

More about the assassination. It is apparently reported in Canton, and is very generally believed, that the officer upon whom it devolved to organize the assassination of Governor Amaral, has been rewarded with a button of considerable ran for his services! And has the promise of a situation of emolument on the first vacancy (from the Hong Kong Register, September 11—Friend of China, September 12, 1849).67

The fear of crime (committed by Chinese) and disorder (conducted by foreigners) in the respective Hong Kong communities needs to put in context. While the British Government might not have been ready to invest heavily in Hong Kong due to legal uncertainty (a treaty not yet having been signed), economic difficulties and a lack of political commitment (politics at home, differences between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, conflict between Whitehall and trade representation), a local vibrant expat community was fast emerging and consolidating, and they were committed to making Hong Kong a home away from home. More significantly, they wanted to make Hong Kong every bit like the home they left behind in Europe, with an elegant lifestyle and high culture to match. Their expectations were high (which exacerbated the fear of disorder and the unknown and therefore a sense of helplessness). Thus we witness in 1843, the expat community in Hong Kong attempting to bring high culture to Hong Kong, a place with no culture:

Advance Hongkong!!! Theatre Royal … Messrs. Dutronquoy & Co. at length the satisfaction of announcing to the nobility, gentry and clergy thus flourishing and opulent Colony, that the Theatre is advancing most rapidly towards completion. It is on a most splendid scale, and what with the pieces that will be performed, the Scenery that will be introduced and the splendid assemblage of rank, beauty and fashion which they hope to be honored with, there is no doubt but that the blaze of Splendor will dazzle the eyes of all beholders. Vivat Regina. N.B. The actresses have arrived during the last week, their beauties and talents are only to be surpassed by their spotless virtues.68

By 1847, the European community has secured itself a well ornate Hong Kong Club as the center of community social activities.69

The two groups of people (European and Chinese), while different in ethnic composition, cultural disposition and economic circumstance, had one thing in common. Both had uprooted themselves from well-established societies to a new land in search of fame, fortune, adventure and a safe haven. They exhibited unbound personal aspiration and few communal bonds/restraints. “Hong Kong became a society of immigrants, sojourners, transients and aliens.”70 As a noted sinologist of the time, Dr Eitel, observed in 1891:

The Chinese also, the refuse of whose lowest classes began, early in 1884, to flock to the site of the present city of Victoria, consisted during the first few years of our Colonial history, chiefly of boat-people, common labourers, stone-masons, blacksmiths, and provision dealers, all of whom have come to Hong Kong, in defiance of Mandarin prohibitions, for temporary employment rather than as settlers and left their families on the mainland. They naturally had neither the time nor inclination to think of the education of the young.71

One of the many things that separated the two groups related to the fact that the expat group, notwithstanding having been transplanted from a distant land and uprooted from a different society, still enjoyed a sense of identity, entitlement, community and permanency due to their elevated social status, superior economic position, dominant cultural symbols and controlling political institutions. This was not the fate of the Chinese, who had found themselves in a permanent state of denial and drift:
As regards the population of the island, one third have no land habitation but live wholly on the water, another third may be considered in a perpetual state of migration and shifting domicile, and even upon those more respectable people who have longest inhabited the island we have lately seen that more than twenty thousand have abandoned their families and their business at the arbitrary mandate of the mandarins on the mainland.72

Since the Chinese—local and transplants—refused to accept British rule, they found themselves aliens within their own (Chinese) land and culture. “Any Chinese resident here would at present hear with amazement that either himself or his children were no longer regarded as owing allegiance to the Emperor of China but to her Majesty.”73


On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong sovereignty reverted back to China.

Still, we now see more churches than temples, more blonde in bikini than Chinese in cheongsam, more calculator than abacus, more lawyers than mediators. Notwithstanding, after 15 years few in Hong Kong if any would remember, still less sing the praise or level a curse at the British, for leaving the Hong Kong people with so many cultural artifacts (for better or ill).

Looking at Afghanistan, colonial history is repeating itself - American military will leave, eventually, but American culture would stay, forever.

Who is there to clean up the alien culture for Hong Kong and Afghanistan people, after the colonizers depart, with Hong Kong children crowding to Pizza Huts instead of visiting traditional tea houses and Afghanistan kids chanting Martin Luther King than one of their national heroes.

At the end of the day: Whose dream should Hong Kong and now Afghans be pursuing? Whose dream indeed.

Wednesday, February 29, 2012

Relationship Poliicing vs. People Policing

Everyone has hopes and dreams, often time dismissively called "personal" agenda. Mine is to make a different in the studying, and in turn (time) understanding, of policing, as we know it.

In the case of 中国警务 (Chinese policing),it is an error to believe that 中国警务 needs to be developed along western lines; disarmingly, seductively and now compelling called scientific, professional, and of late, in HKc context, progressive best policing practices. Nothing is further than the truth.

To me, policing is first and foremost about fostering and mending relationship (关系警务论). People rarely kill - hurt friends, with relationship as bonds (孔子, 礼, 仁). (Confucius, Hirschi) People routinely destroy - damage enemies,as things of (dis)utility. (Bentham - moral calculus)

Evidence for above observation is everywhere. Communal - affective life ("we" network, @HK 1950) is harmonious thus peaceful; daily, fierce and rancorous family "feud" notwithstanding. Individual - rational existence ("me" network, @China 2012) is competitive, thus conflictual; appearance of regularity and orderliness not withstanding.

I am developing a theory of "guanxi" relationship policing, a radical departure from "people" policing. I need all the help I can get.

Our job as students - intellectuals - scholars, is to dream big and think/act small, one idea/thing/step at a time, in correcting myths (Chinese police should copy from the West) and removing paradigm (legal/bureaucratic/professional policing model is the ONLY way to do policing).

Policing is not about enforcing strict law but fostering good relationship.

"Knowledge never rests, people do" (KCW, 1987)

Friday, February 17, 2012

Jeremy Lin (JL) and Cultural Marketing

JL is big business for NBA and related US merchandises.

JL is a marketing dream come true for US big businesses from Nike to NBA franchise. It certain helps to deflate the US trade deficit with China. ("Linsanity" a marketing dream in Asia.”

Let us see how “Linsanity” works out in dollars and cents, and in turn whether it makes sense:

(1) JL makes about $762, 195, or about $12,000 per game.

(2) The labor cost per pair of NIKE shoes made in China is $2.42. The market retail price is about $65. NIKE makes about $32.50/pair of shoes (APPENDIX I).

(4) If NIKE sells 1 million pairs of NIKE on account of “Linsanity”, that amounts to $32 millions of profit, net.

How do we make sense of this “Linsanity” NIKE transaction?

(1) NIKE (NBA) pays JL $762, 195/yr.
(2) Chinese people buy NIKE shoes in the millions.
(3) Chinese laborer gets paid $2.42 for making per pair of shoes.
(4) MIKE keeps $32.5 as profit.
(5) NIKE adds no value to the pair of shoes, other than promoting JL, a cultural product.
(6) NIKE MBAs are sipping cold latte in air condition offices in front of a computer, working 9/5 or flex hrs., with big pay checks, creating a wholesome image of JL.
(7) Chinese laborers are sweating in the factory 12 hr., a day, with subsistence wages, creating the shoes. (Average wage: $300 - 400)'s_Republic_of_China
(8) Environmental, health and other social costs are extra.

If you are a NIKE executive, would you rather have the Chinese making money for you, or doing it all yourself?

In this NIKE case, all business actors are from China – Taiwan: marketing (JL), manufacturing (Chinese laboring), purchasing (Chinese consumers). Yet, NIKE - US makes most of the money in the process. A good deal?

Somebody is laughing to the bank. Brain power over sweat labor, every time.

Now you understand why JL is not (only) about celebrating JL, and Yao Ming before him, for their athleticism. It is about culture marketing, through and through.

The question is, if China, Taiwan, or Asia see through this, would they be buying JL – NIKE still? More importantly, if Asia is not an emerging market, would JL still be an overnight sensation?

There is a good end for this critical piece.

So far this is a win-win situation for everyone involved: China gets her hero. Chinese youths get their shoes. JL gets to be famous. NIKE gets the money. US gets to reduce its trade balance. A fair trade, all round! Who is complaining?


"What exactly is the labor cost of Nike shoes?

The cost of labor for Nike products varies slightly by model, volume and sources. As a general rule, labor represents about 15 percent of the price Nike pays the factory for the product. Because Nike's cost is about 25 percent of retail cost, labor accounts for about 4 percent of the retail cost. The breakdown is roughly as follows:

Let's say the consumer pays: $65
Retailer pays: $32.50 to Nike, and then doubles the price for retail.
Nike pays: $16.25 and then doubles the price to retailers for shipping, insurance, duties, R&D, marketing, sales, administration and profits.

The $16.25 price paid the factory includes:
Materials: $10.75
Labor: $2.43
Overhead + Depreciation: $2.10
Factory Profit: $0.97

Total Costs: $16.25

Thursday, February 16, 2012

Cultural lessons (life lessons) of Jeremy Lin

I am truly happy for Jeremy Lin becoming a NBA superstar. He worked hard for it. He deserves it. Apparently he is the first Asian American to have achieved the impossible “American dream” of playing for the NBA, dominated by African Americans. Many commentators have used Lin, a clean cut, respectful, smart, hard working student from Harvard, as a comparison between wholesome vs. unwholesome basketball players. The point: decent attitude and hard work pays. Success comes to those who are decent human beings, on and off the court:

“Lin is not beating his girlfriend with champagne bottles nor leaving dozens of illegitimate kids in his wake. Lin is also a Harvard grad which is a bit more than a GED. Lin is not doing anything like a lot of black players.”

In a more grandiose scheme and (not unrealistic) audacious claim:

“One of the best sports story in our time. He gives hope to a lot of people. If your government, parents, religion cannot give you hope, JLin will give that hope. His perseverance is incredible. Talk about challenges and opportunity combined, this is the best story. God works in mysterious ways. Linsanity continues with 13 assist in 20 minutes against the sacramento.”

“From New York to Asia, Lin is a hoops sensation, 2/16/12”)

We can all agree: Lin is a phenomenon, of yet unmeasured proportion. But, can Lin last beyond the 24/7 media cycle/circus? In performance (capacity) and love fest (attraction)? Only time will tell.

In this blog, I have more serious issues to attend to: is Lin a good role model for our kids?

It is evident, and has been so for a long, long time, distinguished and exceptional sports persons are admired by the public and in particular with young people (esp. lower SEC groups), world wide: Pele of Brazil, Bruce Lee in Hong Kong and Michael Jordon from the US. These stars are watched and followed. In the eyes of the admirers, they can do no wrong.

What do Ln teaches. A lot. Work hard in school (Harvard) and play hard in court (NBA). (This blogger’s teacher used was a NBA player before Yale and lawyering.) Success comes to those who are smart, focused and disciplined. Finally, all of a sudden, basketball is no longer off limits to the bright! Yes, basketballs (NBA), by extension footballs (NFL) and books (Harvard) do mix!! Yes, this is a humble beginning and there is a long, long way before NBA is populated with the book smart rather than street smarts people. (If truth be known, you do need to be smart, street or otherwise, to play in NBA) (In Jeremy Lin, a stereotype that should be celebrated

Now, let us discuss some of the not so good – wholesome lessons of J. Lin:

First, Lin was admitted to Harvard, against all odds (13.4 Asian vs. 17.2 White, 1990 data). He was given a place and a chance over other (more) qualified students (by motive of service) did not make it. In signing up at Harvard, Lin has made a pledge: “I will use my Harvard education for the benefit of society, mankind; not only myself.” Harvard education is not for everyone. It is a national treasure and public trust, for the few who made the lifelong commitment. As such, Lin has an obligation to make good, and contribute back to society, at the highest level his capacity and functions, endowed by parents and trained at Harvard. More importantly, Lin has a personal obligation to put his Harvard education to good use, i.e., befitting his intellectual capacity and academic training. Lin decided to play basketball instead. This is disappointing.

There is nothing wrong with playing basketball and be successful; satisfaction, fame and glory for himself, and even his family and ethnicity. But there is something wrong abut being trained in one area, intellectual pursue, and do another, playing basketball. (Here I assume that that entertaining millions on TV is not as important as helping one person’s life circumstances at Harlam or discovering a new cure for cancer world-wide.)

Lin’s fateful choice is a tremendous waste of resources, for himself, his family, Harvard and US).

The same thing can be said of West Pointers. West Pointers have to give back 8 years for the millions of dollars invested in them. (The larger question is why we as a nation use universities to groom the next generation of NBA, NFL stars, when lesser academically intense sports academy would do? Higher education is an expensive resource, and should not be used to train NBA or NFL players, at the expense of the needy and aspired)

Second, Lin sends a wrong message to the kids world-wide. The message is “be all you can be” – not in scholarship or public service, but in playing balls. More generally, playing balls is more important than any other things on earth, including helping other people in need and making the world a better place to live.

The message that is being sent to the minority kids in the most deprived area is this: basketball and football, not academic studies, is the only (best) way out of ones humble beginning and dismal circumstances.

In the case of deprived and depressed minorities, they are more afflicted by academic vs. NBA choices in life. They need all the help they can get, especially from role model.

In this regard, most minority NBA, NFL players have little to no choice to be academically successful. Due to life circumstances beyond their control, they are not academically prepared for educational challenges. If they want to get out of the project, they can only do so by playing balls (or joining the US Army. But even Army has standards these days).

Lin, however, has all the choices in the world. He chooses to be a basketball player, forgoing his Harvard education, and in time servicing (society) destiny. (He can always come back, yes. But will he? can he? How much is the missing years costing him, and the society?)

The bottom line: if Lin, who has all the choices in the world before him and can be successful in whatever he chooses to do, still chooses to be a NBA player and give up being a Harvard (trained) service professional, the message is loud and clear: basketball-financial reward, before scholarship – intellect satisfaction.

Intellectual pursuits are only second best to playing basketball. That is the reason we are not in competition with the rest of the world who put education before playing balls.


In the end. what is a Ivy (more generally college education) for? What about having a Harvard (college) degree and be a star. (Jody Foster is from Yale, David Duchovny is from Princeton and Yale, Natalia Portman is from Harvard.

I want a happy ending, with uplifting messages, to this rather depression, some say unduly critical (cynical), blog

(1) In joining the NBA, J. Lin might be thinking about changing NBA, more so than,or at least not exclusively, for self serving reasons. With this line of thinking, any "public service" type of motive would be welcomed, including showing Chinese - Taiwanese are not only bookworm.

(2) Notwithstanding J. Lin's present circumstances and motive, but in line with Harvard's tradition, J. Lin and many others to follow, would transform the NBA industry, in a positive way, call this NBA version 2.

(3) In spite of J. Lin's present circumstances, playing in the NBA, J. Lin will have to retire one day. At that point, he can still use his Harvard education for public good.

(4) J. Lin, can make tons of money and donate it to charity.

Still, the above rosy endings do not take away the major thrust of this blog, i.e., there is an adverse culture lesson being promoted - making money is more important than other more worthwhile pursuit in life!

That is what capitalism is all about.

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

Criminal record and credit score

Recently I read a news item on credit rating:
“7 Things You Didn't Know Affect Your Credit Score” (Feb. 14, 2012).
This gets me thinking out loud.

From the earliest of time, ones reputation in the community matters. If you are a “bad” girl you cannot get married (moral reputation). If you are a “lazy” person you cannot get a job (professional reputation). If you are “dishonest” you are good as dead (integrity reputation). If you mixed with the “wrong crowd” you are shunned (social reputation). The worse that can happen to you is when you have a “criminal record” (CR) (personal reputation). With a CR you cannot find a job, have friends, and start a family.

In 20th century and within a consumerist world, the only thing that matters is your “credit score” (CS). No (low) CS, no (low) life. Without a good credit, your life - financial, social and professional, is not going anywhere.

CS is now the CR of old, a total measure of who you are as a person.

If you are not paying your bills on time or not at all, your reputation is ruined, and in turn livelihood suffers. With a low CS rating, you are deemed not dependable as a worker (professional), trustworthy as a friend (integrity) and worthwhile as a human being (personal). Bad things follow: you cannot get a job, you cannot get a loan, you cannot buy a house, you cannot start a family and you are watched over at workplace, by friends and agencies. You are a pariah. You are not welcomed as a person in the society. For example, in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Police has a strict and stiff policy for disciplining and firing officers with a chronic indebtedness issue. So much so that police officers do everything to dire their indebtedness, and ever killed themselves over indebtedness, if known. (Kwan Tung-lo, “Indebtedness of Hong Kong police officers: gambling or overspending” HKU, 2000)?

In everyday life, CS is a good social control device. People are much, much more concerned with a low CS than a serious/lengthy CR. For one it is consider inappropriate to discriminate against a person with a prior CR, no matter how heinous “Oh! Give people a chance” or “He has pay his debt to society”. The US Constitution even offer up privacy protection for CR, e.g., concealment of juvenile records.

People would make allowance for bad crimes but not bad credit. If you have a poor CS, you are punished everyday through high prices on everything – from insurance to buying a house. As a result people would do everything and anything to keep their CS clean, good, low. This includes spending thousands to clean up their CS.

It is about time we pay more attention to the utility and limitations of CS as a social control device. If we do it right, may be it helps to predict, deter and reform undesirable conducts (crime) and persons (criminal).

Sunday, February 12, 2012

Studying Hong Kong Police Research

The study will be a part of my upcoming book, now in progress: POLICING IN HONG KONG (Florida: CRC - Taylor and Francis, 2013); final chapter? I will be using the 8-18 to look at how far the HKP has come in reform, or to some getting rid of the old ways. (This book has a different tone and textual than the on I just finished: POLICING IN KONG KONG (UK: Ashgate, 2012).

My overall approach to research in policing generally and as applied to HKP (or for that matter PRC "gongan") is that we should take an inside out and bottoms up approach. More importantly, we should get away the well beaten path of "best practices" as shaped and defined by the West. This is not to say that HKP or 中国公安 has nothing to learn from others, including the West (particularly UK or US). (三人行, 必有我师言。。。)But people ought to remember that HK is not UK and China is not US. Since Sir Robert Peel famously said: "The people are the police and police are the people." Policing cannot be fashioned away from the "expectations" of the people. (My theoretical rendition being: "The person who is closet to a problem - by impact and with resource - is the person to take care of the problem." Problem means "expectation denied". (Wong, "State Police Powers as a Social Resource Theory.")

I start with the proposition that ALL policing are local affairs, and in turn denominated by its culture and driven by its people. An elitist, top down, approach, in any other name (democratic, professional, legal policing), does not work, and would not last. Simply put: Professional policing - in the image of crisp uniform and polished car - is not policing in the raw, and certainly not people's policing.

In the study (reform) of PRC - HK police, I have argued elsewhere that consulting Mao ("群众伦“[mass line] on community policing & "矛盾伦“ [on contradiction] on fighting terror) is better than following what Peel. (I am now seeking to bring Mao up to date, and SCIENTIFICALLY.) By the same token, it is best to adopt 情,理,法 as justice principles than promoting legalism (legal fetish) as a rule

Whitney Houston and (Drugs) Addiction

On March 11, 2012, Whitney Houston sang her swan song; she died a premature death at her prime of 48. She has earned her keep. She will be remembered. She will be loved. She is the best of her kind – a church gospel singer transformed into an international; pop phenomenon, with grace and beauty to match.

Now some of Houston’s death fall outs. Most (all) cried over her departure. Many (some) blamed drugs for her downfall. A (vocal) few want Houston’s death to be a lesson to the younger generation – just say no to drugs.

I think it is a good idea to use Houston’s death as a teaching case, moment. She is truly a one of a kind “star” of unsurpassed proportion and unmatched achievements. She is not to be confused with or upstaged by many, many other to follow - “pretenders” ? “want to be”? “Clone” for mass marketing.

I write this blog entry for one simple reason. We need to use Houston’s death judiciously to teach the right lesson: Drugs do not harm, “addictions” of all shape and kinds do.

First, drugs, however potent, do not kill or even harm. In fact, drugs can be used to do good, from relieving pain, e.g., morphine for wounded soldiers, to helping improve performance, e.g., coffee before mid-term, to creating social atmosphere, e.g., before dinner drink in party. In essence, what, when, how we use drugs matter.

Second, drugs do not do anything in or of themselves. People use drugs to do all sots of things, to self and others. In America we have a drug (culture) problem. We use drugs to solve all our problems, large and small, a first resource and not last recourse. For example, we use drugs, not training, to improve performance. We use drugs to make us do things that we cannot or should not be doing, e.g., improving sex life beyond our prime. Finally, we use drugs to induce happiness or suppress unhappy moments, e.g., binge drinking. In the end, we believe the magic of drugs, over human effort and beyond human capacity. This is the real problem with drugs we have, the culture of drug use, not drugs, is the problem.

Third, ultimately, drug is not the problem, “addiction” to drugs is. Drug problem is really an “addiction” problem. To say that we are addicted to drugs is to say that we are no longer in control of ourselves, in what(ever) we do. We ignore the side effects of drugs, in order to get the desire effects – momentary high, at the expense of long term health issues. Thus, drug problems we have individually, and more so, as a nation, is one of lack of self discipline.

Fourth, in line with ("Third" above), we in the US have all kinds of addition problems, many of them much more serious than drugs. As a nation, we need to deal with “addiction” , not drugs, as the problem or all problems:

(1) We are addicted to conspicuous consumption. We keep buying, consuming and trashing material goods, at the expense of inner peace and contentment, otherwise known as happiness. In being addicted to consumption, we are no more different than the drug addicts – seeking a new high – a Ford Model T then and i-Pod 3 now, not realizing that things do not make people happy, beyond the momentary thrill of the moment. Happiness is something we have to discover for ourselves, not given to use, like drugs. We can only derive true and enduring happiness in finding, sharing and giving meaning to and of life, through contemplation, more commonly known as soul searching.

(2) We are addicted to war (in larger context, violence). We keep invading countries and killing people. No single country have fought more wars and kill more people than we do as a nation: Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan…just the big ones. War addiction gets us high, in the heat of battle, and in anticipation of peace (or pacification), only to start all over in a wild goose chase, wasting our nations precious blood and treasures, chasing meaningless one high after another.

(3) We are addicted to sex. Sex addiction gets us turned on, artificially (cosmetics, bikini), and manipulatively (marking, packaging). Sex addiction makes us desire sex, not love/romance which leads to sex. Sex addiction makes us marry for sex, and separate for lack of sex or in want of (novel) sex. More damningly, sex addiction, conditioned us to see others only as sex objects, for our utility, and momentary release, not as valuable human beings of their own right, fit for total involvement and destine for long term engagement. It makes us attracted to others for their outer appearance and not internal strengths/virtues. It makes us relate to each other on sexual groups, and not other mote important, multiplex, and enduring, human qualities.

(4) We are addicted to computer, virtual reality and social networks. Addicting to computer is a serious problem. Being addicted to texting means more accident on the road. Being addicted to e-mails and web surfing means we are not focused on our work. In the old days, hermits write books in ten and more years, now we cannot be engaged for more than 5 to10 minutes at a time. (That is the reason why we no longer produce classical books and enduring thesis.) Being addicted to social network and married to virtual reality takes away from everyday human intercourse, and human conditions, the soul of human existence, the fabric of life. The process makes us less and less human (quantity – speed and frequency - of communication do not make for quality – intimacy and intensity - of relations, less and less social (yes, social network is not social at all, not when we an cut people off at will and with a push of the mouse), we are dying a slow death, as person and collective. Our addiction to computer technology makes us part company with the collective and human society we live in, in search of a reality that only exits in the mind. It makes us all dreamers in a virtual world, where everything is possible and nothing is for real.

Wednesday, February 8, 2012


Prof. Kam C. Wong, J.D., Ph.D.
Department of Criminal Justice
Xavier University
Cincinnati, Ohio

ABSTRACT: This article is brief review of “Police Reform in China” (CRC: Taylor and Francis, 2011) (“Reform Book”) and its major findings. The Reform Book, in seven chapters (introduction, obstacles, taking stock, legitimacy, reform, accountability, reflections), variously deals with current status, future prospect and research development of PRC policing. The Reform Book points to clear evidence of successful bureaucratization, professionalization and legalization of police work in the reform era, conducted in the spirit of Mao’s “mass line” political doctrine and in line with the scientific postulates and predictions of Wong’s (黄锦就) “State Police Power as a
Social Resource Theory” (“以国家警察作为社会资源伦”).

Some ten odd years ago, I started researching police reform in China and in 2002, I published my first article on this subject.[2] This was followed by Policing in China: History and Reform [3], a broad study giving an introduction to the origin, history, culture, education, reform and theory of policing in China.

In my 2002 article, I stated three conclusions about the current status, future prospects and difficulties about researching police reform in China. Due to the time that has gone by and the increased knowledge of the field, these subject matters deserve a second look.

With respect to current status (2000) of police reform, I said then:
“The Chinese public security system is changing in fundamental ways. It is in the process of re-generating itself. The impetus of reform has come from within as well as without the organization. The forces of change have been both economic and social, though political considerations have invariably played a part. The direction of reform has been towards more rationalization, institutionalization and legalization of police service.”

With respect to the future prospects of police reform, I raised the follow questions:

Less clear is: what does the future hold for police reform in China? In this regard there are two questions that are of most concern: the durability of past changes and the direction of future reform. For example, will the police reform process sustain itself? How fast, how deep and how comprehensive will the reform process be? In what direction and manner will the reform process move in the short and the long term? More significantly, what will the public security system "with Chinese characteristics" look like?”

With respect to the problems of research, I made the following observation:

In this first attempt to investigate police reform in China we find that: we know more about stated objectives and espoused purposes than unarticulated priorities and hidden agenda; we know more about public commitments than private ambitions; we know more about what the Party and central government wanted than what the professional officers and local administrators desired; we know more about official pronouncements than common understanding; we know more about theory, policy, laws and regulations than social reality, street practices and individual idiosyncrasies; and last, but certainly not least, we know more about reported compliance and noted successes than hidden defiance and undisclosed failures. In sum, we know more about the formal and official aspects of the reform, to the exclusion and at the expense of the more important (for our purpose of analysis) unofficial and informal accounts of changes that transpired. An informed and balanced judgment on the future prospect of the current reform process has to wait for more objective information and properly conducted surveys: not to mention an enlightened perspective and seasoned analysis.

In this short review essay, I will revisit the above three observations on (A) “Status,” (B) “Future” and (C) Research of police reform in China, in the light of current research findings reported in my “Reform Book”.

A. Status
Much that was said about the status of police reform in 1990s still holds true today, i.e., the Chinese police has changed in “fundamental ways” and is in the process of “re-generating itself.” “The direction of reform has been towards more
rationalization, institutionalization and legalization of police service.”
The “Reform Book” is an extension and elaboration of the 2002 study theme, but with a different focus and approach.

The 2002 study is an overview of police reform in China. There I reported on what is known about police reform in China in a systematic way, i.e., mission, values, power structure and status, organization and process, and leadership.

The “Reform Book” builds upon the 2002 study. It seeks to lay the necessary foundation for the healthy development of a Chinese police research and discourse field, by debunking myths, proposing methods, offering perspectives, raising issues and supplying data.

First of all, the “Reform Book” is dedicated to revealing how little we know about Chinese policing, in theory and especially in practice (Chapter 3 “Taking Stock”). For example:

We know very little about the theoretical and empirical relationship, necessary or contingent, between Chinese political-ideological development, leadership - personality transition, and social – economic change vs. MPS strategy, PSB policing tactics and frontline officers’ behavior. For example, how does a shift in political ideology from revolutionary communism (Mao) to socialism with Chinese characteristics (Deng) impact upon the direction of police reform? (“Research agenda and issues (1995 – 2010)”, Chapter 3)? How do changes in successive generations of political and police leadership affect police work (“Leadership footprints”, Chapter 1)?

We know very little about what Chinese-style policing is all about (“Conceptualizing policing with Chinese Characteristics”, Chapter 5)? In what way is it similar and to what extent is it unique when compared with other Asian police agencies, such as those of Hong Kong?

We know very little about what Chinese people “think” and “feel” about their police (e.g., on corruption, Chapter 5). In the study of policing, understanding what people “think” or “feel” matters, it being more important to understand the latter than the former. In theoretical terms, a bottom-up understanding of the police from the people’s perspective is more important than a top-down understanding based on the state’s pronouncements.

We know very little about how police “insiders” view police reform from “bottom up” (police on O/T, Chapter 3, “32 Classical Police Sayings”, Chapter 6). What is the role of frontline PSB officers in the formulation of MPS strategy? What is the impact of police reform on police officers (“Impact of police reform”, Chapter 1)?
Second, building upon Policing in China: History and Reform (Chapter 1) I propose to change the way we investigate and in turn to understand Chinese policing in a particular way. Specifically, I argue that at the present stage [4] of Chinese police study development, we need to adopt more of cultural–anthropological approach[5] rather than a scientific–survey approach to the study of Chinese policing. This means investigating into Chinese history, culture and social conditions, what Chinese called “guo qing” (literally “national circumstance”) in order to provide context,[6] and more importantly to make sense of what is going on.[7]

Finally, in studying Chinese policing it is best to adopt an inside-out, bottom-up approach. Research projects should be driven by an indigenous perspective (“qing-li-fa”, Chapter 1) and informed by empirical data.[8] Researchers should have a bicultural orientation, if not qualifications, e.g. language facility and cultural emersion.[9] Research should focus more on data collection than theory development, more on description than evaluation, more on analysis than on proselytizing, and more on understanding than critique.

What has been achieved in police reform at the end of 2000s over that of 1990s is perhaps as follows:

First, the discovery of a secular police reform ideology. Over the years, there has been a gradual but distinctive shift of political ideology from Deng’s “two hands” (development vs. stability) reform doctrine to that of Hu’s “scientific development outlook” with its harmonious and humanistic approach (“The “fourth generation” leadership: background, vision and mission”, Chapter 1). This turns police reform from a reactive to pro-active mode.

Second, the evidence-based policy-making process embraced by policing that draws upon Marx’s dialectical materialism philosophy, Mao’s “in-practice” action learning theory, and Deng’s “seek truth from facts” thinking. These put police reform policy-making on a factual - rational basis, amenable to factual disputation, accessible to logic analysis, and capable of empirical assessment, away from ideological straightjackets and into policy analysis (“MPS decided that the year of 2002: Change of work-style year, investigation year”, Chapter 5).

Third, the consolidation of the police reform plan, linking political ideology with police reform strategy and policing operation measures under the “Decision regarding strengthening and improving public security work” (November 18, 2003). Police ideology now has to come to terms with grounded problems and emerging issues in a systemic, comprehensive and coherent manner.

Fourth, with scientific study and through trial and error, the Party and MPS leaders are becoming seasoned reformers with experience and confidence to match. Chinese police reform is moving into a new phrase, i.e., from fighting bush fire to conducting plan change.

Fifth, police reformers have to come to terms with the structural “contradictions” besetting the reform process, with no end in sight, e.g. the spread of mass incidents. (“Mass Rebellion Against Police Authority”, Chapter 4).

Sixth, the single most important achievement of police reform is the actualization of rule police by law (“yifazhi jing”). Since 1990, the focus has been on the stringent enforcement of police law. The effective implementation of the legal supervision of the police began by educating people and officials to the importance of the law, i.e. building up a legal culture.

Finally, in terms of accountability, the most significant development has been the discovery of public opinion supervision by Internet. On December 4 2009, in a year-end review of notable media related events, Internet public opinion supervision emerged as one of the most important media stories. To many people in China Internet public opinion supervision is democracy in action.

To the socially aggrieved, economically oppressed and legally wronged, Internet enables the “public supervision” of officials and “virtual justice” by netizens.

B: Future
With respect to the future of police reform, two issues present themselves:
Ideologically, Chinese-style policing has yet to be clearly and definitively articulated. This remains an unfinished but on-going police reform project. If it is ever happens, Chinese-style policing is likely to be defined bottom up rather than top down, with the top providing the necessary leadership and the bottom setting the basic parameters. Furthermore, in order to be meaningfully understood, Chinese-style policing needs to be contextualized within a specific time-space milieu. That said, consistent with CCP governance philosophy and mass-line policing theory, it is anticipated that under the broad rubric of Chinese-style policing, there would be many varieties of Chinese-style policing (region by region, e.g. coastal vs. interior; city by city, e.g. Shanghai vs. Beijing vs. Shenzhen) that defy a single approach by policy makers and warrant different research strategies from academic researchers.

Philosophically, can revolutionary policing exist side by side with professional policing? It is now clear that Chinese leadership, especially during the Hu-Wen era, has been seeking to re-invent the police by adopting a bureaucratic – legal – professional paradigm (“professional” policing), without explicitly reconciling it with the revolutionary model. Three assumptions are at work to support this marriage of convenience between “revolutionary” ideals and “professional policing”: (1) The Party leadership considers “professional” police to be an instrumentality of state to serve revolutionary ends, without inherent conflicts, as in the case of the resolute suppression of Falun Gong and negotiated peace-making with “mass incidents”. (2) With the Chinese Party in the lead, neither “bureaucracy”, “law” nor “profession” is allowed to stand above the Party and the mass, as autonomous institutions, with entrenched values and culture to match. In this way, a “professional” officer is first and foremost a “revolutionary” cadre. For example, a “professional” officer is one who is responsive, responsible, fair, competent, good mannered and who works selflessly for the people, just as Lei Feng would. (3) Inasmuch as “revolutionary” policing is a strategy and style and “professional” policing is an organizational principle, there is no conflict between the two. For example, “yanda” can be carried out by professional police according to law.refom”)?

C: Research
Of all the areas of police reform, Chinese police research and publication has made the most improvement (Chapter 3). Reading through national and provincial police journals reveals an increase in the output and quality of police research. We learned that since as early as 1992, MPS has been collecting survey data on the public fear of crime. Over the years, Chinese government research institutes (CASS), police think tanks (MPS Fourth Research Institute), police colleges (PSU), police scholars (Wang Danwei) and academic units (Wuhan – Law School:. Center for Protection for the Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens) have been conducting theoretically driven empirical studies on various aspects of policing in China, from extended detention (Chapter 6) to public opinion on torture. In essence, there is no shortage of data and empirical findings to allow us to make a preliminary assessment of police reform in China. What awaits is for China bound police researcher to provide a (re)analysis of such data (“A case study of ED in a mid-China province, Chapter 6) contextualized with case studies (“A case study of ED: The Cheung Tse-keung case”, Chapter 6).

I would like to close this essay with a review of the book by David Bayley:
“With a rare understanding of Chinese materials, K.C. Wong painstakingly describes efforts to reform the Chinese police during the past decade, courageously exploring sensitive issues of policy and performance. Written in an engagingly personal manner, it is a fundamental book for anyone interested in how modern China manages law enforcement and public order.”[10]

Kam C. Wong, J.D., Ph.D. is Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio; Faulty Fellow, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York (Albany); Visiting Professor of Law, City University of Hong Kong, National Law School (Orissa), India and Chinese People’s Public Security University, PRC. Professor Wong has published 9 books and 100 articles/law reviews/chapters, in 10 countries. His most recent books are: Cyberspace Governance in China (Nova Science Publication, 2011), Policing in Hong Hong (Ashgate, 2012) (Foreword: Distinguished Professor Peter Manning), One Country Two Systems (Transactions Publisher, 2012) (Foreword: Distinguished Professor James Acker), and Policing in China (Pakistan Criminology Society, 2011). He is working on: Policing in Hong Kong: History and Reform (N.Y.: CRC Taylor and Francis, 2013)

[1] Police Reform in China (N.Y.: CRC Taylor and Francis, 2011) (“Reform Book”).
[2] “Policing in the People's Republic of China. The Road to Reform in the 1990s,” Br J Criminol 42 (2): 281-316 (2002).
[3] Policing in China: History and Reform (N.Y.: Peter Lange, 2009).
[4] We need both qualitative as well as quantitative research to understand policing in China. But when beginning to build a Chinese police study discipline, it is more important to provide a more particularized (thorough case study) and contextualized (historical and cultural) study of China in order to improve our understanding of China sufficiently to answer general research questions and help interpret research data. See Chapter 2-3 in Policing in China: History and Reform (Peter Lang, 2009).
[5] Llewellyn and E. A. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman, OK. University of Oklahoma Press, 1941).
[6] Philip C. C. Huang, "Theory and the Study of Modern Chinese History: Four Traps and a Question," Modern China, 24.2: 182 – 208 (April 1998).
[7] “Cultural Cognition Project Study Examines Why “Scientific Consensus” Fails to Create Public Consensus,” Yale Law School, September 13, 200
[8] Kam C. Wong, “Studying China Policing: Some Personal Reflections,” International Journal of Sociology of Law, Vol. 35(3): 1 – 20 (2007).
[9] Philip C. C. Huang, "Biculturality in Modern China and in Chinese Studies,” Modern China, 26.1: 3 – 31 (January 2000).
[10] David H. Bayley, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany (12 January 2011).

One Country Two Systems - Version 2012

Recall the purpose of "One Country, Two Systems" (OCTS) design was to promote and facilitate the integration of two entirely different social, economic, legal, and at the end of the day, convergence of divergent cultural systems.

Since day one, if my reading of HK history is correct, the focus has been on sorting out and bridging law and political differences between PRC vs. HKSAR, one issue at a time, incrementally, imperceptibly. The challenge was whether HK can survive the return of sovereignty as an (relatively) autonomous political and legal systems with the help of OCTS. To this end and for such purposes careers of many (most?) HK politicians, - opportunists, zealots..... - were made, in the street, on TV, at US - for own glory or public interests?

There was never a concern about cultural integration, certainly not with economic discrimination as a spoiler, acting as a "Hong Kong Wall". Indeed, the visionary OCTS and foresighted Deng never contemplated that the battle for the hearts and mind of HK people would be fought along economic, culture lines. The thinking then as now (before Professor Kong and MTR incidents) in China as in HK is a simply, and most pragmatic (realistic) one, one, "money talks", and talks the loudest - over politics, law, and anything and all things in between; to old HK hands in new Chinese hearts. The assumption is money speak in a different - universal language that heal wounds and joint adversaries.

The ever savvy (naive?) Chinese political leadership has since used money strategically, to buy (reward) loyalty (street people, nationalists who dream of united China than distinctive Hong Kong) and corrupt (soften) oppositions (intellectuals, western trained liberals who knows more about Hobbes than Menzhi), in search for a conversion (never mere convergence). The perennial self-assured (cocky?) Hong Kong people never stop thinking (dreaming?), often out loud, that economic is their field and finance is their game. In time Mainland will come into their fold (not the other way around).

What come next in this sage of "clash of civilization" no one can tell, or dare say. Judging from what transpired in the Professor Kong - HK people exchanges of late, and more to come, we are opening another Chapter to OCTS saga, and depending on your orientation - beginning of OCTS integration or end of OCTS as an integrative tool, the fortunes of Hong Kong, laurels of China and legacy of Deng rests.

Whatever your take, Hong Kong, as we know it (HK people) and wish it to be (PRC leadership), for better or worse, will never be the same again.

Sunday, January 29, 2012

Oakland Riot vs. Egypt Revolution?

A riot happened in Oakland California yesterday (1/28/12): “Riot police fought running skirmishes with anti-Wall Street protesters on Saturday, firing tear gas and bean bag projectiles and arresting more than 200 people in clashes that injured three officers and at least one demonstrator? … Officers were pelted with bottles, metal pipe, rocks, spray cans, improvised explosive devices and burning flares," “Police fire tear gas at Oakland, 200 arrested

The Occupy Wall Street (Oakland) tactics of disturbance and Oakland PD strategy of control recalls many other government vs. public confrontations all over the world, at least at this early stage – except in scale and degree of violence. Hong Kong 1967, Beijing 1989, Egypt 2011, Syria 2012. Grievance , protests, control, escalation.

The only difference is perhaps how the “Western world” sees it: legitimate dissents in undemocratic (oppressive) states (China, Egypt, Syria) and lawless disturbance in Western (liberal) democracies.

With this understanding, it is OK to use violence (destructive conducts) to fight off government suppression (attempt to enforce the law and bring order to the street). Failing that, it is necessary to topple the government, with encouragement and armed support of foreign countries. Finally, when “dictatorial” governments fall, with thousands killed and prosperous cities ruined, foreigners – outsiders applaud. We called this Arab, China Spring. The cycle repeats itself.

Now that Arab Spring comes to the US, in the form of Occupy Wall Street. Should we call this Oakland Spring?

Or, should we consider Oakland protesters as:

(1) Unruly mob?

(2) Terrorists?(FBI define terrorism: " The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

Conversely, should we consider Oakland PD’s actions to bring back law and order as abusive police brutality or measured crowd control?

Finally, is the Oakland dissenters/rioters exercising civil disobedience or attempting a violent revolution?

If violence escalates, should other nations, e.g., newly liberated Arab states or established human rights institutions such as UN, be in the position to lecture US on how to deal with Oakland Spring.

Failing that should the UN adopts a resolution condemning police violence or Arab league send in monitor to pacify the uprising?

In the end what is the difference between angry mobs here (Wall Street, Oakland) and violent demonstrators there (Beijing, Egypt, Libya, Syria)? More important, what is the role of government and functions of the police in maintain order, protecting life and securing property, in Egypt vs. US? "Occupy Oakland video: Riot police fire tear gas, flashbang grenades"

“Before we correct other, we need to reflect on ourselves.” (A Chinese proverb)

Sunday, January 22, 2012

Sailing around the world

Sailing the oceans of the world vs. negotiating the sea of humanity

The news headline reads “Teen ends globe-circling voyage in St. Maarten” ( young lady sailor, Dekker (15-16), claims she is the youngest sailor to complete a round-the-world voyage, in a small boat (11 meters).

As with many, I am much impressed with her achievement. The message is people can conquer the world, if they are committed to the cause, and in this case brave the weather and risk the high sea.

The question I have for Dekker is this: Why bother? For example, why a journey around the world at the high sea? Why not negotiate and sail the sea of humanity (or life)?

If Decker is looking for a real adventure and challenges, as a way to test oneself, and learn how to deal with the real world, it seems that the better way is to negotiate the sea of humanity, in everyday life, than try the waters of the great oceans.

Negotiating the sea of life is better because: (1) Negotiating life is real. (2) Negotiating life is much, much more difficult, challenging and educational. (3) Negotiating life is meaningful, because it deals with people, not fishes, unpredictable temper tantrum, not chartable storm. (4) Negotiating life admits no grandstanding. There is no rainbow at the end of the struggle. People do it for survival, not glory, still less movie contract and TV interviews. (5) Negotiating life does not impose on others, from satellite tracking to rescue mission. (6) Lessons from negotiating life is useful. (7) Negotiating life is free. Sailing around the world takes and make money. (8) Negotiating life is required. Sailing around the world is by choice (9) Lastly, and most importantly, negotiating life is a 24/7 career, and sailing the ocean is a onetime journey. (10) Negotiating life has no end, and cannot be stopped mid-stream. Sailing across the ocean has an day, and like social network, one can drop out at will.

This note is dedicated to all those who is negotiating life and sea of humanity without fanfare. They are the unsung heroes, many times over, than Decker, could every be, or want to do. She has abandoned collective life for solitude at sea. Why should Decker be getting credits for the second, when she would not or cannot do the first, by choice? Why should Decker be able to claim credits (youngest person to negotiate high sea) when other who are more (at least equally) deserving in negotiating the sea of humanity not be mentioned (youngest person 6,7,8, negotiating life, in India, China, Burma) ?

Saturday, January 21, 2012

Arab Spring and Wall Street Autumn

2011 was an eventful year for politics. We witnessed the arrival of Arab Spring in the Middle East and Wall Street Autumn in America.

Arab Spring registers signs of optimism (at least relief) – better days on the horizon. Power to the people; Egypt, Libya, Syria. One after another oppressive powers fall.

Wall Street Autumn emits evidence of despair (at least trouble) – weary road ahead. More power to the overlords; Wall Street, military complex, professional politicians.

Democracy is dead. Money talks. Reasons walk.

What happened, and why?

What happened is that we have forgotten our founding fathers’ pledge and quests:
We the people have the right and ability to solve any and all problems confronting us. In theoretical terms, and modern day practice: “The person who is closest to the problem, by impact or with resource, is the person to solve the problem?” (Kam C. Wong)

This means:

(1) People, not the government establishment or Washington experts, decide what the problem facing this country is or is not. For example, minority interests, bankers, should not trump or dictate national interests.

(2) People’s voices should be heard, not silenced by force and arms – forced eviction in Wall Street, pepper sprayed in UC-Davis.

(3) Power back to the people. A majority of the people has no faith in their government, e.g., politicians, Party or Congress. Changing political leadership every so often does not seems to help, e.g., Obama acts more or less like Bush! Most people are not happy with the direction our nation is heading.

(4) As a people, we should take responsibility for our own actions.

(4.1) Be realistic. Live within our means. Bigger things (NFL stadium) is not better. More rights (without corresponding duties) is not good. Material goods do not bring happiness.

(4.2) Be wise. Spend appropriately. A few basketball players get paid thousands per game. Thousands of teachers make hundreds per month. Thousands of lawyers get rich by creating disputes and destroying relationships. Millions of construction workers starved to keep roof over the lawyers' head allowing their families to live happily thereafter. A 20 something makes billions in an air condition office after a few months/years to buy bigger and better video games. A nation of laborers sweat under the sun for life to put bread on the table

(4.3) Be honest. Stand up for our principles. No double standards or empty talk.
(4.3.1) We cannot invade other nations and kill other nationals, in the name of fighting terrorism.
(4.3.2) We cannot begin to tell other nations/people what to do, when we do not know their history, speak their language, or understand their culture. For example, Ms. Clinton, Secretary of State, lectured China on human rights, when she has little facility with Chinese.
(4.3.3) Ms. Clinton declared virtual war to disrupt China to advance free internet when our government is monitoring all e-mails in and out of the US.'
(4.3.4) Our (few) soldiers cannot rape and kill other nationals but not be held responsible to other nations' law. Many in fact get away with murder (for cooperating with prosecution) by plea negotiation in US military courts. They should be held responsible to the same degree as if they had kill and rape in the US.
(4.3.5) We cannot keep invading other countries and building more advance weapons, and other people to love peace and forgo arms,

(4.4) Be fair. Pay everyone the same. Why should brainy people enjoy intellectual property's rights for years, after their intellectual labor is done, and laborers do not enjoy laborer's right in like manner and degree. Pay up when you ride a car made by a laborer!!!

(4.5) Be visionary. Live for the future. As a nation we cannot keep supporting big military with deficit spending (more bombs and plans) and keep weakening education by starving our teachers (less bread & butter).

(4.6) Be strong. Stand up for what we believe in. Learn from Arab Spring. Do not take no for an answer.

In the end, might (economic, political, military ) does not make right. Or, do they?